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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
1.1. INTRODUCTION 
Government procurement  refers to the purchasing by government bodies from 
external providers of products and services that these bodies need in order to carry 
out their public service mission.1 This covers a wide range of transactions; from 
the purchase of stationery, insurance services, to construction of roads, schools, 
hospitals and power stations.2 Consequently, purchases made by a government 
constitute a large portion of government expenditure in any given country, for 
instance in 1998, this amounted to 7.57% and 5.10% of national income for 
industrialised and non-industrialised countries respectively.3 
 
As a result of such status in the economy, government procurement is used to 
achieve a number of objectives and these vary from one country to another. The 
primary objective of procurement is to obtain value for money that is, to 
successfully acquire goods, works or services at the best valuable terms.4 Other 
objectives closely related to the procurement process include; enhancing 
efficiency in procurement and promoting integrity by eliminating corrupt 
practices. Countries also use procurement to achieve industrial, social and 
environmental objectives.5 Industrial objectives can be met by supporting a 
particular industry, for instance the Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs). 
Through selective government procurement a country may seek to empower 
previously disadvantaged ethnic communities by giving them preferential 
                                                 
1 Arrowsmith, ‘Government Procurement in the WTO’, (2000) Kluwer Law International  at 3 
2 Arrowsmith, Linarelli and Wallace, ‘Regulating Government Procurement: National and 
International Perspectives’ (2000) Kluwer Law International at 1. 
3 OECD (2001), ‘The Size of Government Procurement Markets’, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/34/14/1845927.pdf  last accessed on 5th April 2007 
4 Arrowsmith et al Op cit note 2, at 15 
5 See McCruden, ‘International Economic Law and The Pursuit Of Human Rights: A Framework 
for Discussion of The Legality Of 'Selective Purchasing' Laws Under The WTO Government 
Procurement Agreement’ (1999)  2 Journal of International Economic Law at 3 
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treatment in government business.6 Procurement may also be used to promote 
environmental protection, as well as the promotion of human rights through 
selective purchasing. In order to achieve these objectives, a country will put in 
place a particular domestic regulatory system. As a result of varied objectives to 
be achieved, the nature of domestic laws on government procurement differs 
between countries. Such regulatory systems will reflect the economic, political 
and legal context within which it is adopted.7  
 
The international regulation of government procurement has developed to reflect 
the above mentioned objectives which exist in countries where each particular 
instrument operates. As such the existing international instruments seek to 
regulate procurement by establishing common rules among countries. These vary 
from regional procurement systems which apply to a particular group of countries 
seeking to achieve the stated goals of the regional grouping. Examples of these 
include the European Union, the non binding principles of the Asia Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC), the rules contained in the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and in Africa the most advanced is the procurement 
initiative for the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). 
Another important source of international procurement standards is the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on Government Procurement of Goods, Construction 
and Services (hereafter the Model Law) which many developing countries and 
economies in transition have adopted as a basis for their procurement laws. 
International lending agencies such as World Bank and other regional banks also 
influence procurement regulations particular in developing countries.  
 
One of the most important objectives for regulating procurement is to promote the 
liberalisation of procurement markets. The Government Procurement Agreement 
(GPA) is the only agreement within the World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
                                                 
6For instance Section 217 of the South African Constitution, permits procuring entities to give 
preference to historically disadvantaged persons. For further discussion see Arrowsmith, 
‘Government Procurement in the WTO’ (2003) Kluwer Law International. 
7 Trepte , ‘Regulating Procurement: Understanding the Ends and Means of Public Procurement’ 
(2004) Oxford University Press at 36.  
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framework that regulates government procurement but this is only a plurilateral 
Agreement and applies to only WTO members that accede to it.  The Agreement 
sets minimum standards of a good procurement system that members must adopt 
based on the principles of non-discrimination and transparency. However, 
membership to this GPA has been limited to a few countries predominantly 
developed countries for instance to date no African country has acceded to the 
Agreement. Developing countries have shunned the Agreement on the premise 
that it is likely to curtail their ability to use the regulatory mechanism of 
government procurement to meet individual country needs and objectives.   
 
Faced with limited success in the WTO, the proponents of further liberalisation of 
government procurement, mainly developed countries, are increasingly 
negotiating Regional and Bilateral Agreements (hereafter collectively referred to 
as Regional Trade Agreements) with similar or more binding provisions than 
those contained in the GPA. Furthermore, developing countries are also adopting 
similar principles within existing regional trading arrangements such as Common 
Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA).  It would therefore appear that 
efforts towards liberalisation of government procurement markets shifted from the 
multilateral forum of the WTO to the bilateral and regional spheres. This has 
resulted in the creation of parallel systems of procurement standards with 
overlapping membership. The regulation of government procurement in RTAs 
does certainly impact on the role of the GPA as a leading instrument of 
government procurement standards that the WTO seeks to entrench among its 
members. 
1.2. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
Government procurement is a very important aspect of international trade as it can 
either promote or inhibit trade depending on the laws and policies of a country. 
The current regulatory differences in government procurement between countries 
constitute a potential barrier to trade through discriminatory and non-transparent 
systems. Efforts to create an international standard on government procurement 
that would address such issues within the WTO have achieved limited success. 
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The GPA, the only Agreement that provides a set of principles on government 
procurement, is plurilateral and its membership is dominated by developed 
countries but has largely been ignored by developing countries. Instead countries 
are opting to regulate government procurement through Regional Trade 
Agreements. These are being signed between developed and developing 
countries, and between developing countries with extensive provisions on 
government procurement that to an extent resemble  or are more binding than 
those in the GPA. The resultant effect has been the creation of a parallel system of 
procurement regulation independent of the WTO. Whereas in some instances 
RTAs have promoted the principles of the GPA even to non members, they have 
also lessened its relevance as an international standard on government 
procurement within the multilateral trading system.  
1.3. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
The significance of this study primarily rests on the importance of government 
procurement not only in a country’s economic and social policies but also in 
international trade. This research is therefore important in as far as it will analyse 
the implications of negotiating government procurement provisions in RTAs as 
against the WTO. It is hoped that this will contribute towards better policy 
formulation on government procurement which is based on an understanding of 
the current developments at the regional and international level. The research is 
particularly important for developing countries’ trade negotiators as they 
negotiate regional and multilateral trade agreements, as it seeks to determine the 
most suitable forum in which government procurement should be dealt with.  
1.4. SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
The research will be confined to issues pertaining to the role of RTAs in 
establishing government procurement standards that resemble or conform to those 
of the GPA in developing countries. For purposes of this research RTA will 
include Free Trade Agreements and Bilateral Agreements. The study will use 
Africa as a case study by evaluating selected RTAs that have been signed. This 
will in turn focus on a few RTAs such as the Procurement Initiative of the 
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Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the US-Morocco 
Free Trade Agreement. 
1.5. OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
1. To examine the role of the existing international regulatory instruments 
towards the harmonization of global standards on government procurement. 
2. To analyse the  role of the WTO’s GPA as a possible global standard for 
government procurement and to investigate reasons of limited membership by 
developing countries 
3. To evaluate the provisions of government procurement in Regional Trade 
Agreements as they relate to principles established in the GPA and to assess 
their implications on the harmonization of government procurement standards 
within the WTO. 
4. To give recommendations to policy makers on the most suitable forum for 
effective regulation of government procurement.  
1.6. METHODOLOGY 
This will be a qualitative research in which both primary and secondary sources 
will be used. Among the primary sources are international instruments such as the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on government procurement and the WTO Agreements 
as they pertain to government procurement. Other primary sources will include 
Regional Trade Agreements that deal with government procurement. Secondary 
sources such as text books, journal articles, and reports will be used to provide an 
analysis of the primary sources. The internet will be an important source of up-to-
date information on the developments on the subject of government procurement 
not only at the multilateral and regional level but also in the domestic sphere of 
countries. 
1.7. PROPOSED CHAPTER OUTLINE 
This paper is comprised of four chapters. Chapter one provides the general 
context of the research by giving a background to the study while highlighting its 
significance. This chapter will also identify the objectives for conducting the 
research. Chapter two will examine in detail current international instruments in 
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government procurement. The chapter will evaluate the principles of government 
procurement as contained in the GPA and it will investigate the reluctance of 
developing countries to embrace such standards. Chapter three will analyse and 
compare the provisions on government procurement in selected Regional Trade 
Agreements in Africa in order to determine to what extent these conform or are 
based on the established GPA principles. This chapter will assess whether the 
RTA positively impact on international harmonisation of government 
procurement principles. Chapter five will contain a wrap up of the research giving 
the researcher’s recommendations in view of the assessment made in previous 
chapters.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
AN EXAMINATION OF INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS OF 
GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT IN THE WTO AND 
BEYOND 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
The regulation of government procurement has gained increased importance as 
the multilateral trading system tackles non-tariff trade barriers usually in the form 
of restrictive domestic laws that impede market access. To this end, the WTO, 
like its predecessor the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) has tried 
to put in place a regulatory mechanism that ensures non-discriminatory and 
transparent procurement systems in the territories of its members. This approach 
is premised on the belief that the effect of restrictive government procurement is 
to reduce both global and national economic welfare and that unilateral 
liberalisation in government procurement, as in markets in general, is good both 
for the world and the liberalising country.8 The GPA seeks to realise these goals 
although it has been shunned by many developing countries which seek to keep 
procurement a preserve of national policy uninhibited by international 
obligations.9 On the other hand, there are other international instruments such as 
the UNCITRAL Model Law which establish a set of similar principles albeit with 
different objectives. Whereas the GPA has not been adopted by many developing 
countries, these countries have embraced the UNCITRAL Model Law as basis for 
their procurement laws and policies. 
 
This chapter will examine the justification of regulation of government 
procurement within the GATT and WTO system. This will include an analysis of 
                                                 
8 Arrowsmith  Op cit  note 1 at p.19 
9 This is reflected in the membership of the Agreements which is dominated by developed 
countries. Members covered by the Agreement include: Canada; the European Communities, 
including its 25 member States; Hong Kong, China; Iceland; Israel; Japan; Korea; Liechtenstein; 
the Kingdom of the Netherlands with respect to Aruba; Norway; Singapore; Switzerland; and the 
United States. 
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the developments of the current provisions dealing with procurement in the WTO. 
The Chapter will analyse the various principles contained in the GPA and also 
investigate the reasons for its limited acceptance among developing countries. 
This will be followed by an overview of other existing standards on government 
procurement specifically the UNCITRAL Model Law and the procurement 
standards of International Financial Institutions such as World Bank in order to 
asses how these relate to the GPA. 
  
2.2. FROM ‘NEGATIVE’ TO ‘POSITIVE’ HARMONISATION: 
UNDERSTANDING THE DEVELOPMENTS  
 
The quest for an international standard on government procurement under the 
WTO framework can be understood in what Heiskanen explains as a ‘change in 
the regulatory philosophy in the multilateral trading system.’10 He states that the 
underlying regulatory philosophy of the multilateral trading system at the signing 
of the GATT was the elimination of discrimination between domestic and foreign 
goods, and between products originating from third countries.11 This allowed 
countries to pursue substantially divergent regulatory policies provided that these 
policies were not discriminatory in their letter or application therefore creating 
‘negative harmonisation.’12 However, with the considerable reduction of tariff 
barriers through consecutive trade rounds, the focus shifted to barriers that existed 
within the border such as restrictive government procurement laws and practices, 
intellectual property laws, technical barriers to trade and Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary measures. The vast differences between various national regulatory 
regimes came to be seen as an impediment to international trade. This led to the 
change in focus from the elimination of discrimination (negative harmonisation) 
to the creation of a uniform global regulatory structure (positive harmonisation). 
The principal function of such agreements is to promote free trade by eliminating 
                                                 
10 Heiskanen, ‘The Regulatory Philosophy of International Trade Law’, (2004) Journal of World 
Trade 38(1), 1  
11 Ibid at 14 
12 Ibid  
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discriminatory domestic regulations and establishing a global regulatory 
infrastructure by harmonizing the existing domestic regulation to an international 
standard.13  
  
Such harmonisation of domestic regulation is driven by inter alia, the desire to 
have a level playing field between domestic and foreign traders. Furthermore, it is 
argued that harmonised laws improve transparency in international trade. 
Transaction costs are also reduced where laws are based on a common standard. 
Similar arguments have been forwarded by the proponents of multilateral 
disciplines on government procurement in the WTO. These efforts to achieve this 
within the WTO raises questions as to whether such positive harmonisation of 
government procurement standards is possible since countries are generally 
reluctant to accept complete harmonised rules covering policy goals.14 
  
2.3. EVOLUTION OF GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT IN THE WTO 
The importance of government procurement in the international trading system 
dates back to 1947 during the US led efforts to establish an international 
economic system that would help dismantle existing trade barriers and prevent the 
erection of new barriers. During this post World War II period, trade barriers were 
blatantly protectionist in favour of the domestic industry, these included high 
tariffs, quotas, and import bans against foreign industry.15  Consequently the 
Havana Charter of 1947 was drafted with the aim of creating the International 
Trade Organisation (ITO) to tackle such trade barriers. Although the Charter was 
never passed, it resulted in the creation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) in which states undertook to eliminate most trade barriers with 
notable exception of non tariff barriers such as subsidies to national industries and 
                                                 
13 Ibid at 16 
14 This leads to the broader question as to whether the WTO is a suitable forum to achieve such 
harmonisation as this was not in its original mandate. Reich identifies issues such as the trade bias, 
democratic deficit and the politicized environment of the WTO to make it unsuitable to achieve 
harmonisation of laws. See further  Reich , ‘The WTO as  a Law Harmonising Institution’ (2004 )  
25  University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law  321 
15  Arrowsmith ,Op cit note 1 at 32 
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government procurement.16 As a result Articles III.8 and XVII.2 of GATT 
explicitly exclude government procurement from the obligation of national 
treatment. This was contrary to the US Draft Proposal that suggested that the 
principle of national treatment and Most Favoured Nation principles should also 
apply to government procurement.17  
 
This status quo was maintained until 1979 when the Tokyo Round Agreement on 
Government Procurement (also known as the Code on Government Procurement) 
was concluded and came into effect in 1981.18 This was significant as the Tokyo 
Round of negotiations (1973-81) focused on the elimination of non tariff barriers 
and it resulted in many codes to deal with these issues.19 However prior to this, 
efforts to liberalize government procurement markets were taking place at the 
regional level within Europe20 and later within the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD). The work of the OECD was important as 
it provided a global forum for discussing government procurement and its work 
was used as a basis for the discussion for the GPA. 21  
 
The Government Procurement Code provided for rules on non-discrimination and 
transparency in award procedures. However it was limited in many aspects for 
instance it only pertained to central or federal governments, its coverage was 
limited to only supplies (goods) and it did not cover services. The limited 
membership of the Agreement was the biggest restriction on its application. Only 
a small number of countries signed the Agreement and these were mainly 
                                                 
16  Ibid   
17 Articles 8 and 9 US Draft of the ITO Charter. See further Arrowsmith ibid note 1at. 32 
18 See further Arrowsmith Op cit note 1 
19 In addition  to the Agreement on Government Procurement ,this round resulted in other Codes 
such as  the Anti-dumping code, the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, the Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing measures, the Customs Valuation Code and the Agreement on 
Import Licensing Procedures. 
20  This was within the European Free trade Area (EFTA) and the European Economic Community 
now the European Community. For a detailed account of the development of government 
procurement see further Blank and Marceau , ‘The History of Government Procurement 
Negotiations since 1945(1996) 5 Public Law Review  77  
21 See further Reich, ‘International Public Procurement Law: The Evolution of International 
Regimes on Public Purchasing. (1999) 12 Kluwer Law International at 107 
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members of the OECD with notable absence of developing countries. This is 
mainly because the provisions of the Agreement were on the work that had been 
done within the OECD and it therefore made it easier for the European states to 
accept a global system of regulation.22  
2.3.1. The 1994 Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) 
Due to its limitations on coverage, the Tokyo Round Code was revised during the 
Uruguay Round between 1988 and 1993. This resulted in the current Agreement 
on Government Procurement which was signed in 1994 and came into force under 
the auspices of the WTO. Although it is modelled on the Tokyo Code, it improved 
upon the old Agreement in a number of ways; it covers procurement for both 
goods(supplies) and services including construction, there has been a great 
extension of procuring entities covered, and the remedies for enforcing the 
Agreement have been improved. However, the Agreement is only a plurilateral 
Agreement and binds only members that accede to it. This in effect makes the 
Agreement optional unlike the other WTO Agreements (multilateral) whose 
provisions are binding on all members as a ‘single undertaking.’23  Due to its 
voluntary nature, the GPA suffers a similar problem of limited membership as its 
predecessor, with only 38 signatories out of the 150 WTO member states.24 The 
limited number of signatories and the fact that these are mainly developed 
countries is indicative of the fact that the GPA is yet to be embraced as an 
international standard on government procurement. 
2.3.2. Working Party on the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS) Rules  
Another initiative for multilateral disciplines was operated under Art. XIII.2  of 
GATS which provides that multilateral negotiations on government procurement 
were to take place two years after the coming into force of the Agreement. To this 
end the Working Party on the GATS rules was established in 1995 with a mandate 
of conducting these negotiations.  The purpose of the negotiations was to address 
                                                 
22Arrowsmith Op Cit at .33 
23 Article II.2 of the WTO Agreement provides that all  the multilateral Agreements  are an 
integral part of the  of the  WTO Agreement  binding on all members 
24 This number is as per January 2007.  See note 9  
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the exclusion of government procurement from the obligations of non-
discrimination under the GATS Agreement under Article XIII: 1 which excludes 
government procurement of services from the most-favored nation requirement of 
the GATS (Art. II), specific commitments on market access (Art. XVI), and from 
obligations of national treatment (Art. XVII). There were however conflicting 
views on the scope of the negotiating mandate as contained in Art. XIII some 
members taking the view that this was limited to transparency, but did not include 
aspects of market access.25  Negotiations in this respect have not yet yielded much 
and in the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference 2005, the Members were urged to 
engage in more focused discussions and to put greater emphasis on proposals by 
members.26 
2.3.3. Initiative for a Multilateral Agreement on Transparency in 
Government Procurement 
 Transparency in government procurement was one of the four so-called 
“Singapore issues” which were sought to be brought within the ambit of the 
WTO’s regulatory system27. At the Singapore Ministerial Conference, WTO 
members agreed to establish a Working Group on Transparency in Government 
Procurement ‘to conduct a study in transparency in government procurement 
practices, taking into account national policies, and based on the study, to develop 
elements for inclusion in an appropriate agreement.28 At the Fourth Ministerial 
Conference in Doha, members agreed that negotiations on government 
procurement would be launched at the Fifth Ministerial Conference subject to a 
consensus on the modalities.29 Government procurement negotiations were to be 
limited to transparency aspects, and would not restrict the ability of countries to 
                                                 
25 See Minutes of the Meetings of Working Party on GATS Rules.  Report of the Meeting of 23 
October 2002 S/WPGR/M/39 12 November 2002. available at www.wto.org  
26  See WT/MIN(05)/DEC of December 22, 2005, Annex C, "Services", para.4(b)  
27 The other new areas included trade facilitation, competition policy and trade and    investment. 
28 WTO Ministerial Declaration, Ministerial Conference First Session, 13 December 1996, 
WT/MIN DEC Par. 21. 
29 WTO, Ministerial Declaration ,Ministerial Conference Fourth Session ,14 November 2001,WT 
MIN(01)/NOV/W/Doha Declaration par 20-26 
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give preferences to domestic supplies and suppliers that is; it excluded issues of 
market access.30  
 
In spite of this limitation, developing countries were opposed to such a 
multilateral initiative, the major concern being that the negotiations on 
transparency were being used as a strategy for procurement market opening in 
developing countries.31 According to Arrowsmith, the main problem was the 
difficulty in separating issues of transparency from market access and that the 
divide between these two aspects was blurred.32 For developing countries, 
transparency is regarded as a means to an end rather than an end in itself and the 
intended objective of discussions in transparency is a way to increase access to 
markets for firms from developed countries.33  According to Khor, ‘[the] 
transparency issue was only a first and tactical measure to draw developing 
countries step by step, into the large area of national treatment for foreign firms to 
obtain contracts for government procurement and projects.’34 Following such 
strong opposition from developing countries, members failed to reach an 
agreement on negotiating modalities on government procurement and other issues 
at the Fifth Ministerial Conference in 2003 in Cancun. Subsequently, in the 
decision by the General Council on August 1, 2004, transparency in government 
procurement was struck off the work program for the current round of 
negotiations that is, the Doha Work Program.35 
                                                 
30 ibid ,Par.26 
31 See Fenster, Multilateral Talks on Transparency in Government Procurement: Concerns for 
Developing countries.’ (2003) 34(2) IDS Bulletin 65 at 70. 
32 Arrowsmith, : Transparency in Government Procurement: the Objectives of Regulation and the 
Boundaries of the World Trade Organisation , Journal of World Trade  37(2) P.283  
33 See  Khor, ‘The Real Aim of the Majors’ available at http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/real-
cn.htm  
34 Ibid 
35 Doha Work Programme, Decision Adopted by the General Council on August 1, 2004, 
WT/L/579, para.1(g). 
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2.4. MAIN PRINCIPLES IN THE GPA 
2.4.1. Scope and Coverage 
 The Agreement establishes an agreed framework of rights and obligations among 
its Parties with respect to their national laws, regulations, procedures and 
practices in the area of government procurement.36 It covers procurement of 
goods and services including construction services for both central and sub-
central government entities. The precise coverage of government procurement of 
a member is determined through negotiations and the exchange of concessions on 
the basis of reciprocity. 37 This implies that members open up their markets in 
return for equivalent concessions by other members. However, the Agreement 
recognises the difficulties that developing countries may have in offering 
reciprocal concessions and requires members to put this into consideration in the 
course of negotiations.38 The entities and services sectors covered by the GPA for 
each member country are clearly identified (positive listing) and any procurement 
not covered is excluded.39 It is important to note that the GPA applies to 
procurement of a value not less than the specified threshold level contained in 
members’ annexes.40  
2.4.2. Non Discrimination 
The cornerstone of the substantive provisions of the GPA is non discrimination in 
respect of covered government procurement. This means that member countries 
must adopt the principles of national treatment and the most favoured nation in 
the conduct of its procurement.  The national treatment obligation requires 
members  to accord treatment "no less favorable" than that they give to their 
domestic products, services and suppliers and not to discriminate among goods, 
                                                 
36Article I of the  Agreement on Government Procurement, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter WTO GPA], Annex 4(b)  available at 
http://www.wto.org/English/docs last accessed on 5th May 2007  
37 Ibid Article XXIV 7(b)  
38 Article XXIV (b) states that members must have regard to the Provisions of Art. V which gives 
special and differential treatment to developing countries 
39 Such covered procurement is listed in Appendix 1 in the different annexes. Annex1 contains 
covered entities at the central level  and Annex2 deals with sub central level entities 
40 Ibid Article I.4 
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services and suppliers of other Parties41  Furthermore, each Party is required to 
ensure that its entities do not treat a locally-established supplier less favorably 
than another locally-established supplier on the basis of degree of foreign 
affiliation or ownership or on the basis of country of production of the good or 
service being supplied.42 Closely related to the above is the prohibition to 
procuring entities to impose, seek or consider off sets in the process of 
procurement.43 Off sets are defined as measures used to improve local 
development or to improve the balance of trade of payments accounts by means 
of domestic content, licensing technology, investment requirements, counter trade 
or similar requirements.44  
 
It is important to note that the Most Favored Nation (MFN) obligation, which 
forbids discrimination between different signatory states, does not generally apply 
to the GPA in as far as members’ covered procurement.45 This was done in order 
to encourage reciprocity and avoid free-riding where members would not offer 
concessions in return.46 However, MFN applies during the procurement process 
and as such any advantage such as a price preference or concession given to one 
foreign supplier should be accorded to all parties of member countries involved.47   
 
The effect of the non-discrimination obligations is to preclude a country from 
using procurement to achieve industrial or social policies by giving preference to 
its domestic suppliers or products. For instance, a country cannot use price 
preferences or set-asides for domestic suppliers only nor can it require foreign 
suppliers alone to give performance bonds.48 However a country may apply such 
discriminatory measures if they conform to the general derogations as provided 
                                                 
41 Ibid  Article III.1 of the GPA 
42 Ibid Article III.2  
43 Ibid Article XVI  
44 See foot note 7 of the Agreement.  
45 This implies that if a gives a concession to one party, for instance the opening up of a particular 
entity, it is not obliged to offer the same advantage to all members.  
46 Arrowsmith,Op cit note 1 at 111.  
47Ibid Article III.2  
48 Other types of discriminatory government procurement are indirect for instance product/ service 
specifications where these are set to target a particular group. See also Fenster G, Op cit  at 72 
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under Article XXIII. These relate to the protection of security interests, public 
order or safety, human, animal or plant life or health or intellectual property.  A 
country can also put into place measures relating to the products or services of 
handicapped persons, of philanthropic institutions or of prison labor but these 
measures must not constitute a disguised barrier to international trade.49 
2.4.3. Procurement Methods and Award Procedures (Transparency) 
In order to ensure that the basic principle of non-discrimination is followed and 
that access to procurement is available to foreign products, services and suppliers, 
the Agreement lays heavy emphasis on procedures for providing transparency of 
laws, regulations, procedures and practices.50 Transparency helps to control 
discrimination, by making it difficult to conceal such discriminatory practices, to 
facilitate participation by suppliers unfamiliar with the system and to improve 
information for market access negotiations.51  
 
The Agreement therefore sets up rules to be followed during the procurement 
process. This includes requiring the advertisement of procurement opportunities 
to be published in specified publications within reasonable time.52 It also requires 
that procuring entities adopt competitive tendering procedures. These include 
open tendering where all interested parties can submit bids, or selective tendering 
where only a limited number of invited suppliers may bid.53 Limited tendering, in 
which a contract is negotiated with one supplier without competition can only be 
used in exceptional circumstances.54 The Agreement also outlines detailed rules to 
regulate the conduct of competitive award procedures. It sets minimum time 
                                                 
49 Ibid  
50 Ibid Article VI to   XVII.  Many of the provisions concerning procedural matters are to be 
amended as agreed by the Committee on Government Procurement so as so simplify them. See 
Report of the Committee on Government Procurement (November 2005 – DECEMBER 2006 
GPA/8911 December 2006, available  at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/gp_gpa_e.htm  last accessed on 20th April 2007                                                     
51 Arrowsmith, Reviewing the GPA: The role and Development of the Plurilateral Agreement after 
Doha. 5(4) Journal of International Economic Law (JIEL) 761 at 765 
52 Article IX of the GPA 
53 Ibid Article VII.3 
54Ibid  Article XV 
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limits, the rules on technical specifications required55 and the qualification of 
suppliers,56 as well as time limits for tendering and delivery of documents.57  
 
It should be noted that the GPA only sets minimum procedural standards, but 
provides an exhaustive regulatory system. Countries are therefore able to set up 
stricter or additional standards to suit the domestic needs and to promote their 
own objectives.58  
2.4.4. Enforcement Mechanism  
The Agreement in Article XX provides for an enforcement mechanism where 
aggrieved suppliers can seek redress against the procuring entity. Redress may be 
obtained in a court of law or before a review body established for that purpose.59 
Members are required to provide ‘non-discriminatory, timely, transparent and 
effective procedures’ enabling suppliers to challenge alleged breaches from the 
procurement process.60  The Agreement therefore provides for minimum 
standards concerning the nature of the review body, the procedural requirements 
as well as the remedies that are available. However, each member is free to design 
its own challenge mechanism according to its own legal, constitutional and 
administrative traditions. Such challenge may result in an interim measure being 
issued to correct the breach and to preserve commercial presence. It may also 
result in a suspension of the process except where this would be prejudicial to 
public interest.61  The enforcement mechanism created under Art. XX is unique as 
it permits private parties to invoke WTO-law in domestic courts.  
 
Aggrieved Parties also have recourse to the WTO dispute settlement mechanism 
through their governments under Art. XXII. (2) which states that  "the provisions 
of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
                                                 
55Ibid  Article VI  
56 Ibid Article VII 
57 Ibid Article XI 
58 Arrowsmith et al, Op cit note 2 at 197 
59 Ibid Article XX(6)  
60 Ibid Article XX(1). 
61Ibid Article XX (7)  
 
 
 
 
 18
Disputes under the WTO Agreement ... shall be applicable except as otherwise 
specifically provided."62 Therefore a party to the Agreement may bring a legal 
complaint against another for the violation of the Agreement (violation 
complaint), for instance where a member maintains laws that are discriminatory.63 
A party may also bring a non-violation complaint where, notwithstanding the 
consistency of a particular measure with the Agreement, rights and benefits of 
signatories have been nullified.64 
2.4.5. Special and Differential Treatment 
Article V of the GPA provides for the needs of developing countries. It urges 
parties to take into account the ‘development, financial and trade’ needs of 
developing countries, particularly least developing countries. It recognizes that 
developing countries may need to safeguard their balance of payment positions, to 
promote the establishment of industry including small scale and infant industry 
and the development of regional and global trade arrangements.65 Developed 
countries are urged to increase imports from developing countries by including 
procuring entities that procure goods that are of export interest to developing 
countries. Developing countries are permitted to negotiate mutually acceptable 
exclusions from rules on national treatment.66 Article XVI of the GPA allows 
developing countries, at the time of accession, to negotiate conditions for the use 
of offsets for instance domestic content requirements, but this option is limited to 
certain entities, products and services. The value of the provisions in Article V is 
limited since the language is not binding and the obligations are not enforceable.  
The benefit of these provisions depends on the good will of other members67 
                                                 
62Annex 2 to the Agreement Establishing the WTO contains the Understanding on Rules and 
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes which sets out general rules and procedures for 
the intergovernmental settlement of disputes that occur under the various Agreements of the WTO. 
63 Art.XXII.1 (a) of the  Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 
U.N.T.S. 401, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994). [DSU] 
64 Ibid Art. XXIII.1(b)  
65 Article V.1 of the GPA. 
66Article V.4 of the GPA. 
67 Arrowsmith Op cit note 1 at 350. See also Kessie, ‘Enforceability of the Legal Provisions 
Relating to Special and Differential Treatment under the WTO Agreement’ (2000) 3(6) The 
Journal of World Intellectual Property 955 
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Furthermore, the extent of benefits that developing countries can derive is limited 
by the relatively low negotiating capacity.68 
2.5. UNDERSTANDING THE RELUCTANCE OF DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES 
As stated above, the GPA has received little support from the majority of 
developing countries in the WTO. This is amidst the debate over the benefits of 
membership put forward by the proponents for liberalisation of government 
procurement markets. Developing countries however argue that the benefits are 
negligible and it would be costly to adapt their laws to the standards of the GPA. 
The following sections seek to analyse this debate and assess reasons for non 
membership of developing countries in the GPA. 
2.5.1. Perceived Benefits of Membership to the GPA 
The Arguments made for countries to join the GPA primarily rest on the ideology 
of trade liberalisation and its benefits of increased global and national welfare 
through the operation of the principle of comparative advantage.69 According to 
this argument, procurement liberalization leads to increased competition in the 
local market resulting in efficiency gains for the domestic market and in cost 
savings as prices are reduced between the competing suppliers.70 Furthermore 
competition is said to lead to restructuring of business, innovation, investment and 
growth.71  
 
Another argument for the GPA is that it enables countries to obtain access to the 
markets of other members.72  Although this may be true for developed and 
advanced developing countries, there are several factors that impede the majority 
of developing countries particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa from gaining access to 
                                                 
68 Mavroidis and Hoekman, ‘The WTO’s Agreement on Government Procurement: Expanding 
Disciplines, Declining Membership. (1995) Public Procurement Law Review 63 at 73 
69 This theory asserts that if each country specializes in producing those goods and services that it 
produces relatively more efficiently than other states, then overall welfare will increase. For 
further discussion see Trepte, Op cit Note 7 
70 Arrowsmith et all  Op cit note 2  at 166 
71 ibid 
72 Arrowsmith Op cit note 1 at  note 50 at 104 
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these markets. One of the reasons is the nature of the industries in developing 
countries where firms are small and unable to compete favourably with larger 
firms that have the necessary resources and required expertise. This is worsened 
by the inability to access adequate information of the available market. Another 
factor is the restrictions on market access such as quotas and high tariffs for goods 
of interest to developing countries. In the services sector, the restrictions on 
movement of natural persons make it difficult for firms to operate in foreign 
markets. As such increased membership to the GPA would instead benefit larger 
firms from developed countries by opening up procurement markets in more 
countries.73  
 
Another benefit of having multilateral rules on government procurement is that it 
can help countries that desire to reform their own systems to lock in  reforms 
which may be impeded by political influence in the country.74 Joining the GPA is 
therefore seen as away to entrench domestic reforms against internal opposition. 
Whereas it is true that many developing countries need reform in their 
procurement systems, it is questionable whether the WTO is the best forum to 
achieve this. So far such procurement reforms have taken place unilaterally or at a 
regional level with a good measure of success. 
2.5.2. Reasons for Reluctance to Join the GPA 
Since the GPA is premised on non-discrimination against foreign products or 
suppliers, countries that desire to retain the ability to discriminate find it difficult 
to join the GPA.75 A country may want to favour local goods or suppliers in order 
to pursue ‘non industrial secondary policies such as environment, human rights 
and social policies’ through government procurement.76 Many countries use 
procurement as a policy tool to achieve national objectives but the GPA does not 
specifically provide for secondary policies such as industrial development, 
                                                 
73 Rege, ‘Transparency in Government Procurement: Issues of Concern and Interest to Developing 
countries’ (2001) 34 Kluwer Law 489 at 495.  
74 Arrowsmith,  Op cit note I at 353 
75 Hoekman and Mavoroids posit that this is the obvious hypothesis for limited membership to the 
GPA, See Hoekman and Mavaroidis, Op cit at 73 
76 Arrowsmith, Op cit at 441 
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national employment concerns and social policies.77 Although the Agreement 
provides for limited derogations it does not institutionalize the type of protection 
afforded the secondary concerns in developing and least developing countries.78 
However, it is also important to note that in some instances the desire to maintain 
discriminatory procurement is based on political interests where procurement is 
used to reward political supporters and to perpetuate corrupt practices.79  
 
Another reason for non-membership is that the strict rules on transparency in the 
GPA meant to enhance value for money in the procurement process may hinder 
the same in some situations. This is especially so where the discretionary power 
of the procurement officer to make choices appropriate for a particular situation is 
limited. However, according to Arrowsmith, the GPA does not prevent procuring 
entities from pursuing best practice nor does it constrain the public sector from 
adopting the preferred purchasing strategy.80  Developing countries also argue 
that the cost of implementing the provisions of the GPA will be high and 
burdensome considering the relatively weak and under resourced institutional 
framework.81  
 
According to Rege, a country has to weigh the possible benefits its export trade 
would derive and the efficiency gains that would result from the opening up of its 
market to foreign competition against the administrative burden and the economic 
costs it has to make in bringing its laws into conformity with the Agreement.82 
 
                                                 
77 See further  Carrier J, Sovereignty under the Agreement on Government Procurement 6.Minn.J 
Global Trade 67 at  69 
78 Ibid  at 14 
79 Mosoti: The WTO Agreement on Government Procurement: ‘A Necessary Evil in the Legal 
Strategy for Development in the Poor World?’ (2004) 25  University of Pennsylvania Journal of 
International Economic Law 593 at 594 
80 Arrowsmith, Op Cit  at 106 
81 For instance, a general over view of procurement systems in many African countries shows that 
they are characterized by a lack of professional staff, with a weak or absent regulatory institutions. 
See available Country Procurement Assessment Reports by the World Bank, available on 
www.worldbank.org.  See also Wittig, ‘Building Value through Public Procurement: A focus on 
Africa’ (2003), a paper presented at the 9th International Anti corruption Conference,199,Durban 
South Africa, available at www.worldbank.org  
82 Rege, Op cit at 495 
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For the above reasons, the GPA is currently not an important instrument to 
developing countries in as far as they are not bound by its obligations. Although 
these countries may recognise the importance of a transparent and efficient 
system of procurement as promoted in the GPA, the binding nature of the 
Agreement coupled with its strict enforcement mechanism both locally and within 
the WTO renders membership undesirable.  
2.6. OTHER SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS ON 
GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT 
Where the WTO has failed, other institutions have succeeded in influencing 
government procurement standards in developing countries. The World Bank, like 
other International Financial Institutions has been instrumental in encouraging 
procurement reforms in developing countries as part of its efforts to improve good 
governance. This has primarily entailed the adoption of the UNCTIRAL Model 
Law on Procurement of Goods, Construction and Services (hereafter the 
UNCITRAL Model Law) as basis of procurement laws. Furthermore, the 
international lending agencies also set procurement guidelines to be applied in the 
awarding of contracts in donor funded projects. The following section will 
examine in detail the UNCITRAL Model Law and the different Procurement 
standards set by international lending agencies as they influence domestic 
regulation of procurement in developing countries.  
2.6.1. The UNCITRAL83 Model Law as a standard  
The UNCITRAL Model Law is a template for establishing internationally 
accepted principles of government procurement. Adopted in 1993, the Model 
covers the procurement of goods and services, including construction.84 It was 
designed with a view of helping particularly developing countries and states in 
transition to market economies to put in place procurement laws that could 
                                                 
83 The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) was established by 
the General Assembly in 1966 (Resolution 2205 (XXI) of 17 December 1966) with a mandate to 
further the progressive harmonization and unification of the law of international trade. In 
establishing the Commission, the General Assembly recognized that disparities in national laws 
governing international trade created obstacles to the flow of trade, and it regarded the 
Commission as the vehicle by which the United Nations could play a more active role in reducing 
or removing these obstacles.  See Further www.uncitral.org  
84 Originally it covered only goods but was expanded in 1994 to cover services. 
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promote efficiency, competition and transparency in a way that promotes 
international trade.85  The Model Law was intended ‘to provide all the essential 
procedures and principles for conducting procurement proceedings in the various 
circumstances encountered by procuring entities.’86 It is a "framework" law 
providing only a skeleton of essential provisions on what is considered to be best 
practice of existing national laws.  It contains provisions on the coverage, 
qualifications of suppliers, specifications, procurement methods and their 
operations as well as review procedures when a bidder is aggrieved. 
 
The Model Law is similar in many respects to the WTO’s Agreement on 
Government Procurement with common objectives of promoting international 
trade by eliminating discriminatory policies and to promote competition among 
bidders by enhancing transparency.87 It is however important to note that the 
Model law has as its primary objective to maximize economy and efficiency in 
procurement, an objective not shared in equal importance by the GPA. In the 
spirit of trade liberalization, the Model law in Article 8 forbids discrimination of 
contractors or suppliers on the basis of nationality, a foundational principle of the 
GPA. Other areas of similarity include the use of open tendering as the most 
effective in promoting competition, economy and efficiency; transparency in 
procurement88 and domestic review procedures.89 
 
Although the Model Law generally prohibits discrimination against foreign 
suppliers as stated above, it provides for exceptions where a supplier may be 
excluded on the basis of nationality provided the grounds are set out in the record 
of proceedings.90 It recognizes that a state may want to restrict foreign 
participation in order to protect ‘vital economic sectors of their industry against 
                                                 
85 See the Preamble to the Model law.  
86 Guide to enactment, Par. 12 
87 Preamble to the Model Law 
88 Article  5 and 11  
89 Articles 52-57  
90 Article 8(2) 
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deleterious effects of unbridled foreign competition’.91 This is particularly true for 
developing and countries in transition, which seek to consider economic 
development objectives in addition to price in determining the successful tender.  
Article 34 (4) (C) (iii) lists such other considerations to include; effect on the 
balance of payment, the economic development potential offered by the tenders, 
transfer of technology, and employment. It is envisioned that countries may want 
to expand this criteria to meet other objectives. However, the Model law advises 
countries to take caution in expanding these objectives as their use is discretionary 
and less objective which could impair competition and economy in 
procurement.92  It therefore requires that the use of such policies to be objective 
and quantifiable to the extent possible and that they be expressed in monetary 
terms, as this reduces the scope of discretion and arbitrary decisions.93  
 
The Model Law seeks to strike a balance between international procurement and 
national industrial objectives by permitting the use of a ‘margin of preference’.94 
Articles 34(4) (d) and 39(d) permit a procuring entity to grant a margin of 
preferences in favor of local suppliers and contractors, which must be calculated 
according to the procurement regulations. 
 
The Model law provides a number of advantages over the GPA, one of which is 
that it offers a balance between trade and domestic objectives which may vary 
from one country to another. The Model law gives flexibility to countries to 
choose procurement methods that are appropriate in their circumstances to reflect 
differences in regulatory polices and traditions.95  
 
                                                 
91 Guide to enactment Par. 24 . 
92 Ibid.. 
93 Ibid  
94 Ibid Par. 26. This permits the procuring entity to select the lowest priced tender when the 
difference in price between that tender and the over all lowest-priced tender falls within the range 
of margin of preference. 
95 Arrowsmith, ‘Public Procurement , An Appraisal of the UNCITRAL Model Law as  a Global 
Standard’ (2004) 53  International Comparative Law Quarterly (ICLQ)  17 at p.20 
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Unlike the GPA, the Model law has been widely accepted and has been adopted 
as a basis for procurement reform in several developing countries and countries in 
transition.96 This is partly because membership of UNCITRAL is open to all 
states of all levels of economic development. The wide acceptance has enabled 
the Model law to have a significant impact on reform in the area of government 
procurement. According to Hunja, “the wide participation in preparation has 
ensured that the Model law constitutes what is internationally recognized as the 
fundamental components of government procurement for most states, and sets the 
thresholds by which procurement legislation should be measured.”97    
2.6.2. World Bank and other Financial Institutions 
The policies of different donor agencies in Africa have influenced the nature of 
procurement reforms that countries have undertaken. The World Bank is the 
leading supporter of government procurement reform in Africa, as part of its 
efforts towards good governance. Together with other donor agencies such as 
African Development Bank and donor country agencies such as the United States 
Agency of International Development (USAID), its interest is to curb wastage of 
funds that are given. Furthermore, in the procurement of donor funded projects 
the World Bank like other donors, requires that its guidelines prevail over the 
national procurement laws in all projects where it is involved.98 This results in a 
proliferation of multiple procurement standards that procurement entities must 
master which causes confusion for procurement officers and suppliers, leads to 
lack of domestic 'ownership', and hinders long-term capacity development.99  It 
must be noted that there are ongoing efforts to harmonize procurement policies 
and procedures of financing institutions under the auspices of the OECD 
                                                 
96 African countries that have their procurement laws based on or inspired by the UNCITRAL 
Model Law include; Gambia, Kenya, Mauritius, Malawi, Tanzania and Uganda and others are in 
the process of adopting new laws or revise the old laws based on the model law. Other countries 
Albania, Azerbaijan, Croatia, Estonia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Poland, Moldova, 
Romania, Slovakia,, and Uzbekistan. See further, www.uncitral.org   
97 Hunja, ‘The UNCITRAL Model law on Procurement of Goods, Construction and Services and 
its Impact on Procurement Reform ,ch.5 in Arrowsmith and Davies(eds) 
98Par 1.5 of Guidelines: Procurement under IBRD Loans and IDA Credits, (2004) as revised 
available at www.worldbank.org last accessed on 5th April 2007.  
99 Nwogwugwu, ‘Towards the Harmonization of Procurement Policies and Practices’ (2005) 3 
Public Procurement Law Review 131 at 134.  
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Development Assistance Committee (DAC) in a bid to make aid more effective in 
developing countries.100  
2.7. CONCLUSION  
The significance of government procurement in international trade cannot be 
underestimated therefore highlighting the need for predictable and transparent 
laws and policies.  However, because of the vital role that government 
procurement plays as a tool for realizing different national objectives of each 
country, the harmonization of such procurement laws has proved to be difficult 
within the WTO. The GPA in its current form has failed to attract many 
developing countries which are skeptical of any benefits that will be derived from 
such membership. Not only are these countries concerned about the loss of their 
sovereignty to use procurement as a policy tool to achieve development oriented 
goals but they also perceive the strict provisions on transparency to be too 
burdensome. Nevertheless, the UNCITRAL Model law as promoted by the World 
Bank and other Financial Institutions among developing countries plays an 
important role in promoting harmonization of procurement standards.  The 
UNCITRAL Model Law and to a lesser extent the procurement Guidelines of 
Financial Institutions and donor agencies  help to foster GPA principles of non 
discrimination and transparency among non-members. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
100 See further DAC Guidelines and Reference Series: Harmonizing Donor Practices for Effective 
Aid Delivery and  Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness 2005 , available on www.oecd.org . 
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CHAPTER THREE 
GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT IN REGIONAL TRADE 
AGREEMENTS: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE GPA 
3.1. INTRODUCTION  
In recent years there has been an increase in the number of regional trade 
agreements signed between countries of different levels of development.101 These 
include Free Trade Areas and Customs Unions signed bilaterally between many 
countries. 102 These Agreements cover a wide area of trade issues, the majority of 
which are dealt with in the WTO, but in many instances they also cover topics 
still outside its ambit such as competition policy, labour and environmental 
standards.  A number of these Agreements deal with government procurement as 
a trade barrier and therefore seek to establish fair, transparent and predictable 
laws between members.  Increasingly Agreements are being signed between 
developed and developing countries where the former have sought to achieve 
through bilateral trade agreements what they failed to obtain in the WTO.103 As a 
result there has been a proliferation of these agreements mainly between 
developed and developing countries with extensive coverage on government 
procurement that impose clear and binding obligations on the parties.104 On the 
other hand developing countries are increasingly signing regional and bilateral 
                                                 
101 As of October 2006, 366 regional trade agreements (RTAs) had been notified to the 
GATT/WTO, 214 of which are currently in force: See Report(2006) of the Committee on 
Regional Trade Agreements to the General Council  WT/REG/17  24  November 2006 available at 
www.wto.org  
102  A customs union is defined in GATT Article XXIV:8(a) as the substitution of a single customs 
territory for two or more customs territories, so that duties and other restrictive regulations of 
commerce are eliminated on substantially all trade between the constituent members of the union 
and substantially the same duties and other regulations of commerce are applied by members of 
the union to nonmembers. A free trade area is defined in GATT Article XXIV:8(b) as a group of 
two or more customs territories where duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce are 
eliminated on substantially all trade between the constituent members of the free trade area. 
103 See for instance the reaction of the US Trade Representative after the failure of the Cancun 
Ministerial Meeting in 2003 stating that the US would instead pursue free trade agreements. see 
Robert Zoellick, ‘America will not wait for the won’t-do countries’,  2003 The Financial Times, 
Sept. 22, 
104 See for instance  EU-Mexico ,  US-Chile   and  US-Morocco  Free Trade Agreements  
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trade agreements amongst themselves, in which harmonisation of government 
procurement among the member countries is a major objective.  
 
This chapter will examine government procurement related provisions of selected 
RTAs. The US-Morocco FTA will be used as a case study to examine the 
provisions on government procurement in bilateral trade Agreements that have 
been signed between developed and developing countries.105 The procurement 
initiative of the Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA) will 
be examined as a case study of regional Agreements that deal with government 
procurement through which countries that are not members to the GPA have 
embraced its principles.106 These RTAs will be examined to determine the extent 
to which they apply principles of the GPA. This will be followed by an 
assessment of the implications of RTAs on the development of the GPA as a 
global standard.   
3.2. GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT IN THE US-MOROCCO FTA 
The FTA was signed in June 2004 and aims inter alia, to enhance the 
competitiveness the enterprises of the members, to eliminate  trade barriers to 
international trade  and to establish clear rules governing trade and investment 
between the parties.107 The Agreement not only deals with  trade issues as 
provided for  in the  WTO such as market access, agriculture and intellectual 
property rights, but it also covers areas that are still controversial within the 
WTO, such as  government procurement, environment and labour. 
 
Chapter 9 of the FTA deals with government procurement and as shall be 
discussed below, it seeks to liberalise government procurement in the member 
                                                 
105 See also  US-Chile Free Trade Agreement  available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Chile_FTA/Section_Index.html  last accessed on 
26th May 2007 
106 See also APEC’s Non-Binding Principles (NBPs) on Government Procurement available at 
http://www.apecsec.org.sg/govtproc/gphome.html and the Government Procurement Rules in 
Integrating Procurement Rules in the Americas for the Free Trade Area of the Americas available 
at http://alca-ftaa.iadb.org/eng/gpdoc1/gp1ec.htm . 
107 See preamble to the Final Text to the US-Morocco Free Trade Agreement available at 
http://www.ustr.gov last accessed on 21st March 2007. 
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countries by entrenching the principles of non-discrimination, transparency and 
efficiency in procurement. The substantive and procedural provisions resemble 
those in the GPA, although they vary in detail. Like the GPA, the FTA covers 
procurement in both goods and services, for central and sub-central entities that 
are listed in each Party’s schedule to the annexes.108 However there are a number 
of entities of each Party that are excluded from the operation of the Agreement. 
 
  The principle of non-discrimination is the basis of the Chapter where members 
and their procuring entities are required to treat the goods, services and suppliers 
of the other party no less favourably than their own.109 Article 9.2.4 of the 
Agreement forbids the use of offsets such as the requirement of local content and 
domestic labour to be used in covered procurement. The effect of such provisions 
on non-discrimination is to limit the ability of each Party to use preferential 
government according to the national objectives that are sought to be achieved. 
 
The Agreement upholds the principles of transparency in procurement by 
requiring entities to publish procurement laws, regulations and judicial 
decisions.110 It requires entities to publish in advance a notice of intended 
procurement.111 Furthermore, each party is required to encourage its entities to 
publish as early as possible its planned procurement in a given fiscal year.112  As 
with the GPA, open tendering is the recommended method of procurement 
although limited tendering is permitted in exceptional circumstances where 
certain conditions must be met and the tendering procedure must not be used to 
avoid competition, or to protect domestic suppliers.113  Furthermore, technical 
specifications must be only in terms of performance and functional requirements, 
                                                 
108 Ibid Annex 9-A-1, 9-A-2, or 9-A-3, 
109 Ibid Art. 9.2  
110 Ibid Art.9.3 
111 Ibid Art. 9.4.1 
112 Ibid Art. 9.4.3 
113  Ibid Art.9.9 
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and should not be more trade restrictive.114  The conditions for participation of 
suppliers are restricted to legal, technical and financial ability. 
 
Just like the GPA, Article 9.12 of the FTA requires the parties to put in place 
domestic review mechanisms where aggrieved suppliers can appeal. A member is 
required to select an administrative or judicial authority that is independent of the 
procuring entity being appealed against. This authority is permitted to give 
interim measures but this should be given in consideration of public interest. 
 
The only derogations permitted under the FTA are similar to those in the GPA. 
These pertain to the protection of public morals, order or safety; the protection of 
human, animal, or plant life or health; the protection of intellectual property and 
also those relating to goods or services of handicapped persons, of philanthropic 
institutions, or of prison labor.115 However, these should not be applied so as to 
constitute a barrier to international trade.  
 
It is important to note that the Agreement does not recognise the equivalent of 
Chapter V of the GPA which provides preferential treatment to developing 
countries considering the varied difference in development between the two 
Parties.  Furthermore, the FTA does not provide an option for Parties to negotiate 
any derogations such as the use of offsets as Article XVI of the GPA does. The 
FTA therefore creates reciprocal obligations of procurement liberalisation for 
each of the parties irrespective of Morocco’s level of development.116 Although a 
Party is permitted to modify its coverage of entities, the condition that it must 
offer compensatory adjustment sufficient to maintain a level of coverage 
comparable to that before the modification makes it difficult for Morocco, or such 
other less developed country with a small procurement market, to negotiate 
                                                 
114 Ibid Art.9.7  
115 Ibid Art. 9.15  
116 Although the Preamble to the FTA states that the differences in the Parties’ level of 
development and the size of their economies are considered in the bilateral cooperation, this is not 
reflected in Chapter 9 in which Morocco has assumed similar obligations as the more developed 
United States. 
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acceptable changes, although these may be necessary to achieve certain 
developmental goals. 
 
As has been noted, the FTA is substantially similar in content with the GPA to 
which only the US is a member and as such extends the coverage of the GPA to a 
non-member. With an increasing proliferation of bilateral trade agreements, it is 
opined that this trend will continue as developed countries seek to achieve 
liberalisation in areas not yet agreed upon in the WTO. The FTA therefore fulfils 
the objective of the US which is ‘...to open up opportunities for US suppliers to 
compete on level playing field for foreign government contracts…[and] to push 
for the reciprocal removal of discriminatory government procurement practices in, 
multilateral, regional and bilateral fora.’117 
 
This trend can also be seen in the on going negotiations between the European 
Union and developing countries for the Economic Partnership Agreements 
(EPA’s).118 The European Union’s negotiating mandate seeks to ensure that 
EPA’s create full transparency in procurement rules and methods at all 
government levels and that they establish progressive liberalisation of 
procurement markets.119 Although African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) 
countries are resisting this position and affirming a similar stance as at the 
WTO,120 it seems unlikely that they will be able to succeed in excluding 
government procurement from the final texts of the EPA considering the 
asymmetrical relationship with the EU. 
 
                                                 
117  See United States Trade Representative (USTR) Focus on Government Procurement, available 
at www.ustrr.org  
118 These are being negotiated between the European Union and the African, Caribbean and 
Pacific (ACP) group of countries under the Cotonou Agreement and are to be completed by 1 
January 2008. See  Further http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues   
119 See Directives for the Negotiations of Economic Partnership Agreements with ACP Countries 
and Regions, adopted by the Council on 17 June 2002 http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/bilateral  
120 See for instance Par. 14 of the African Union  Conference of Ministers of Trade ( Nairobi  
Declaration) on Economic Partnership Agreements  April 2006  TI//TMIN/MIN/Decl. 2 (IV) 
available on  www.african-union.org stating that government procurement, and other issues such 
as competition policy be excluded from the EPA negotiations  
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3.3. GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT IN REGIONAL TRADE 
AGREEMENTS IN AFRICA 
Government procurement is increasingly being dealt with in existing regional 
trade agreements between developing countries. In Africa, this was influenced by 
a need to reform the poor procurement systems which still resembled those that 
were inherited from the colonial days where procurement was regarded as a 
‘back-office support function’ and characterised by inefficiency and obscure 
processes.121 Until recent reforms on government procurement, many countries 
did not have principal legislation governing procurement, but there only existed 
subsidiary laws which were passed under the Public Finance legislation.122 
Inadequate laws coupled with weak institutions resulted in procurement systems 
that lacked many of the elements that constitute a sound system that is; a clear 
legal framework establishing the rules for transparency, efficiency and 
mechanisms of enforcement, coupled with an institutional arrangement that 
ensures consistency in overall policy formulation and implementation as well as a 
professional cadre of stuff to implement.123 The state of these laws as well as the 
differing standards was recognized as an impediment to regional trade and acted 
as an impetus for reform. 
3.3.1. Harmonisation of Procurement Disciplines in the COMESA Region 
The Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA) was set up in 
1994 to replace the Preferential Trade Area (PTA). This economic grouping 
constitutes of 20 members with an average population of 370 million people.124  
The project towards the reform of public procurement in the COMESA region 
dates back to 1998 during a conference on Public Procurement Reform in Africa, 
in December 1998 in Abidjan, Coted’Ivoire. The conference highlighted the need 
to accord a higher strategic priority to public procurement reform. In line with the 
                                                 
121 Hunja ,’Obstacles to Public Procurement Reform in Africa’ available on www.wto.org  
122 See for instance the  World Bank’s Country Procurement Assessment Reports for of Nigeria, 
Uganda and Tanzania available at  www.worldbank.org  
123 See World Bank ‘Elements that Constitute a Well Functioning Public Procurement System’ ,available 
on www.worldbank.org  
124 The Member states are ; Angola, Burundi, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, 
Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, 
Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
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recommendations of the Conference, the COMESA Council of Ministers 
commissioned a study on public procurement laws, regulations and practices 
across member states to determine the state of government procurement laws in 
the member states. The study revealed that, although there existed procurement 
laws in most COMESA countries, these laws were deficient and some aspects of 
the laws tended to restrict free trade.125 
 
This led to the initiation of the COMESA Procurement Reform Project that 
commenced in 2002 with the assistance of the Africa Development Bank.126  The 
main aim of the project was to improve procurement systems among member 
states and to help start the process of harmonizing laws, procedures and practices 
on procurement. The reform of procurement laws was in accordance to the 
COMESA Treaty objectives of creating an enabling environment for 
investment;127 the harmonization or approximation of laws of the Member States 
for the proper functioning of the Common Market;128 and the probation of any 
practice which negates free and liberalized trade.129 
 
This project was successfully completed in December 2004, and according to the 
Project Completion Report, it has achieved some of its principle objectives; 
increased awareness of the need to improve governance (economic efficiency, 
transparency and accountability) in public procurement, and enabled the passing 
of the COMESA Public procurement Framework Directive by the Authority 
(Heads of State and Government) in Khartoum in 2002.130  The Directive is to the 
effect that Public Procurement Reform in COMESA should best be attained 
                                                 
125 See Report available at www.comesa.org  
126 Africa Development Bank gave a grant of UA 1.17 million towards this project. See African 
Union Website www.afdb.org for details of the project. 
127 Article 3 ( c) of the COMESA Treaty available at http://www.comesa.int    
128 Ibid Art. 4(6) b 
129 Ibid Art.55 
130 African Development Fund , Enhancing Procurement Reform and Capacity Project, Appraisal 
Report, available on 
http://www.afdb.org/pls/portal/docs/PAGE/ADB_ADMIN_PG/DOCUMENTS/OPERATIONSIN
FORMATION/COMESA%20-%20%20PROJECT%20JULY%202006.PDF   last accessed on 20th 
March 2007. 
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through: (i) the adoption of modern national legislation on public procurement 
where it does not exist, or the improvement of national legislation where it is 
outdated in line with the UNCITRAL Model Law; (ii) adoption of the principles 
and essential components of national legal frameworks for enhancing regional 
integration; and (iii) establishment of a technical committee on public 
procurement.  
 
As a result many countries have adopted new procurement legislation and others 
are in the process of reforming already existing laws to bring them in conformity 
with the Directive131 In order to consolidate the achievements of the procurement 
reform project, COMESA with the assistance of the African Development Bank 
has set up plans for a project that will enhance these reforms. The Enhanced 
Procurement Reform and Capacity Project (EPRCP) aims to improve the 
management of public expenditures and to create a more conducive environment 
for public procurement. The project is also intended to improve national 
procurement systems through transparent rules, regulations and procedures and 
ensure sustainability of good practices in public procurement.132 
3.3.2. Other Harmonization Efforts 
 
Closely resembling the COMESA initiative is the West Africa Economic and 
Monetary Union (WAEMU) Procurement Initiative. The  WAEMU regional 
grouping was  created in 1994 with the main aim of strengthening the 
competitiveness of the economic and financial services that can be integrated into 
the international economy and is made up  of eight  West African states; Benin, 
Burkina Faso, Cote D’Ivoire, Guinea, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo.133 
 
                                                 
131 Uganda and Madagascar and Malawi have new legislation based on the UNCITRAL Model 
Law. Ibid.  
132 Ibid    
133See Treaty Establishing the West African Economic Union available at  
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/fta/agreements/waemufta.pdfhttp://www.uemoa.int/uemoa/historiqu
e.htm  
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The procurement initiative started in 2002 with the adoption of a Code of 
Transparency in Public Finance Management by the WAEMU Council of 
Ministers, in accordance with a Directive of the Heads of State and 
Government.134 The Code calls on member states to modernize their public 
procurement systems. With assistance from the African Development Bank and 
the World Bank, a regional public Procurement Reform Program was established. 
The first phase of the project (2002-2005) was aimed at helping member states to 
modernize public procurement rules by aligning them to international acceptable 
standards. This was done by designing a community wide harmonization 
instrument that would serve as a community regulatory framework.  The project 
also sought to build on the expertise and institutional capacity for government 
procurement among member states. The second phase of the project is to focus on 
harmonization by helping states to incorporate the procurement regulations into 
domestic legislation; to implement standardized tender documents; and to 
increase on the institutional capacity of the member states.135 
 
There are similar reform efforts in other regions, such as the Arab Maghreb Union 
(AMU) consisting of Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia. Like 
other efforts, the member countries seek to harmonize their public procurement 
legislation and regulations, however there is a focus on opening up the public 
sector to the small and medium sized enterprises in the sub-region.  With the 
assistance of development partners like the World Bank and the International 
Trade Center, the AMU also seeks to build up the necessary expertise on 
government procurement.  
 
From the foregoing, it can be seen that like other developing countries, African 
states are in the process of reforming their procurement laws to internationally 
acceptable standards such as those set by the UNCITRAL Model Law. There is an 
                                                 
134 African Development Bank: Appraisal Report Project in Support of Public Procurement 
Systems Reform In The WAEMU Zone (Phase II ), 2006 available at 
http://www.afdb.org/pls/portal/docs/PAGE/ADB_ADMIN_PG/DOCUMENTS/OPERATIONSIN
FORMATION/UEMOA%20ENG%2004.12.06.PDF  last accessed on 20th March 2007 
135 Ibid  
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explicit recognition of the importance of transparent systems of government 
procurement both for good governance as well as improved trade between 
countries.  
3.4. IMPLICATIONS OF RTA PROVISIONS ON GOVERNMENT 
PROCUREMENT FOR THE GPA 
The impact of RTAs on the GPA is best understood within the context of the 
current debate between multilateral and regional approaches to the global trading 
system. With the current problems facing the WTO, not least because of the 
soaring numbers of members with divergent interests, there has been an increase 
in RTAs where negotiations are between smaller numbers of countries making it 
easier to conclude agreements. This has resulted into two parallel systems of trade 
governance, each having an influence on the other. This section will examine the 
implication of RTAs on the GPA as a standard of government procurement 
principles. 
3.4.1. GPA Equivalent and GPA-Plus Agreements 
As shown in the US-Morocco FTA, many RTAs are mainly modeled on the GPA 
applying its principles of non–discrimination, transparency, accountability and 
due process but to different extents.136 On the obligation of non-discrimination 
imposed by both the GPA and RTAs, it is important to note that whereas the 
former permits developing countries certain derogations that can be negotiated in 
line with their development needs; this option is not available in RTAs between 
developed and developing countries. The RTAs take the position of two equal 
parties with equal obligations and do not in effect recognize the differences in 
levels of development.    
 
In some instances RTAs go beyond the scope of the GPA thereby acquiring GPA-
Plus status. One of the ways this has been done is by binding non GPA members 
                                                 
136 See  also OECD Report , ‘The Relationship between Regional Trade Agreements and the 
Multilateral Trading System: Government Procurement’  2002 available on  
http://www.oecd.org/trade  last accessed on 17April 2007  
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to obligations similar to the GPA as is the case with Morocco.137 Furthermore, 
RTAs go beyond the GPA in their scope and coverage for instance, in the US-
Morocco FTA, build-operate-transfer contracts138 are covered although there is no 
mention of this in the GPA.139  Some RTAs also cover more entities and provide 
for lower thresholds than are required by the GPA. This results in more 
procurement being covered and available to the international market through 
deeper integration that is desired by the proponents of increased liberalization. It 
has been argued that in some instances regional approaches that go beyond the 
GPA might pioneer new approaches that can be a basis for progress at the 
multilateral level.140 
3.4.2. Facilitation of domestic reform 
It has been argued that RTAs help to prepare countries for membership of the 
GPA by facilitating domestic reform on government procurement.141 This is 
because states that have already instituted domestic reforms that conform to the 
standards of the GPA will find it easier to adopt WTO principles.142 As illustrated 
earlier in this chapter, many African countries have initiated procurement reform 
of their national laws at the impetus of a regional initiative. As result for instance, 
COMESA member states have undertaken to conform their laws to the 
UNCITRAL Model law which promotes similar ideals of a competitive and 
transparent procurement system as the GPA. However the non binding nature of 
RTAs implies that reforms will depend on the good will of the member countries.  
This is also true of Bilateral Trade Agreements which require countries to amend 
their domestic laws to conform to the Agreements. Closely related to the above is 
                                                 
137 See also FTAS between EU-Mexico, US-Chile. 
138 These refer to any contractual arrangement, the primary purpose of which is to provide for the 
construction or rehabilitation of physical infrastructure, plant, buildings, facilities, or other 
government owned works, and under which, as consideration for a supplier’s execution of a  
contractual arrangement, a procuring entity grants to the supplier, for a specified period, temporary 
ownership or a right to control and operate, and demand payment for the use of, such works for the 
duration of the contract. 
139 Arrowsmith is of the view that these should be included in the GPA as they are increasingly 
being used by developing and developed countries alike. See Arrowsmith Op cit note  102 
140 Crump L, “Global Trade Policy Development in a two track system’ (2006) 9 Journal of 
International Economic Law 487 at 495 
141 Arrowsmith Op cit 102 
142 Ibid  
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that RTAs may give countries technical experience that would be useful to 
prepare members for accession to the GPA. RTAs therefore help to strengthen the 
internal structures and institutions that are vital for proper implementation of the 
provisions of the GPA.  
 
There is however no supporting evidence to show that a country that has instituted 
reforms to the level of the GPA required standard is willing to join the 
Agreement. Indeed although procurement reform has taken root in Africa, there is 
no indication of any interest to join the GPA as no African country is a member to 
the Agreement and none is negotiating accession. This indicates that although 
developing countries appreciate the value of an efficient and competitive 
procurement system, their continued absence from the GPA can be attributed to 
the strict obligations that may impede their ability to regulate procurement 
according to the needs of a country.   
3.4.3. Benefit to third parties 
Since RTAs promote open and competitive procurement markets among member 
states, this has the unintended effect of providing improved market access for 
third parties not belonging to the regional grouping. The requirement to publish 
intended procurement and to conduct procurement in a transparent manner 
enables even non members to benefit from such rules.  For instance, according the 
COMESA Procurement initiative, members are to avail information concerning 
available procurement opportunities through the COMESA procurement website 
which all interested parties can access.143 In this way RTAs help to further 
liberalization of procurement markets as envisaged in the GPA. 
3.4.4. Technical Assistance 
Another aspect is that RTAs foster cooperation and technical assistance among 
participants to help them meet international standards. To this end the World 
Bank and the African Development Bank are helping to finance procurement 
reforms through regional harmonization initiatives in the COMESA region and 
                                                 
143 See website; www.simba.comesa.int  The functionality of this website is limited as there  is 
very limited information on procurement opportunities in the member states. 
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the WAEMU as stated above. Technical assistance is necessary to improve the 
institutional capacity of countries to deal with ensuing procurement reforms as 
these have been identified as obstacles to efficient systems. Furthermore, financial 
assistance is necessary to conduct sufficient research on the implications of 
procurement reforms.  
3.4.5. A source of Divergence 
Although it is recognized that to an extent RTAs have a harmonizing effect of 
government procurement standards, it is also true that in some instances they may 
lead to divergence at the international level. This arises where different standards 
exist between different regional and bilateral Agreements. Furthermore, RTAs 
frustrate progress at the multilateral level by locking in agreements that respect 
regulatory differences. Consequently they reinforce national regulatory autonomy 
and ultimately become a stumbling block to the multilateral system.  RTAs may 
also impede further developments and reform at the multilateral level where they 
have adopted similar provisions. The general effect of RTA on the application of 
the GPA as an acceptable international standard on government procurement is to 
erode enthusiasm for the latter’s membership since it is perceived to be easier to 
negotiate at the regional level than within the WTO.144 
3.5. CONCLUSION 
From the foregoing it can be concluded that although the GPA has not gained 
wide acceptance among developing countries as a global standard, its principles 
are being adopted by the same countries through commitments made in Regional 
Trade Agreements. As illustrated by the US-Morocco FTA, the Chapters on 
government procurement of many Regional Trade Agreements particularly 
between developed and developing countries resemble in many respects the 
provisions of the GPA. Similarly, developing countries are reforming their 
procurement systems on the impetus of regional agreements like COMESA to 
acceptable global standards such as those established by the UNCITRAL Model 
Law which bears similarities with the GPA 
                                                 
144 Picker, Regional Trade Agreements v the WTO’ (2005)  (26) 2 Uni Pa J.Int’l Econ.Law  267 at 
275 
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The implication of these RTAs on the role of the GPA as a global standard 
depends on whether they are based on similar principles.  Where RTAs adopt 
similar standards, they can promote the progressive harmonization of government 
procurement standards between countries by requiring non GPA members to 
reform their laws to these standards. However, RTAs may also have the undesired 
effect of rendering the GPA irrelevant since similar commitments can be obtained 
without recourse to the rigorous negotiations in the WTO and worsened by the 
fear of its strict dispute settlement mechanism.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
4.1. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This research has established that government procurement is important for a 
number of reasons. One of these is that it constitutes a large market for potential 
suppliers in view of the large expenditures involved and it is therefore of interest 
to proponents of increased trade liberalization. On the other hand it is an 
important regulatory tool that governments use to achieve different national 
objectives and they desire to maintain the ability to use this tool without 
restrictions. The existing domestic and international instruments on government 
procurement reflect a conflict between these two aspects, therefore highlighting 
the need to strike a balance between international free trade and the domestic 
needs of a country.   
 
Where domestic laws on government procurement are out right discriminatory 
against foreign goods or suppliers, or are non-transparent so as to discourage 
competition, free trade is restricted. Furthermore, the existence of various 
standards and procedures between countries is said to constitute a barrier to trade, 
therefore necessitating the establishment of a minimum standard of procurement 
through the harmonization of domestic laws. To this end the UNCITRAL Model 
Law and the GPA are so far the two leading international instruments that set such 
standards, and establish the principles of non-discrimination and transparency as 
necessary for a good government procurement system. These two instruments 
have been used as a basis for reform of procurement systems in many countries 
and are complementary in many aspects as they both seek to accomplish similar 
objectives of promoting international trade through the establishment of 
transparent and non–discriminatory procurement systems. Although the 
UNCITRAL Model law is of no legal effect, its use as a basis for domestic  
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procurement laws  has helped to  harmonize government procurement standards 
even among non- GPA members. 
 
In its current form the GPA has not attracted the participation of developing 
countries which believe that there are more costs than benefits to accession to the 
Agreement. Of major concern is the feared erosion of national sovereignty to 
regulate procurement to meet particular objectives because of the strict obligation 
of non-discrimination. This is coupled with concern that the costs of adhering to 
the procedural requirements to enhance transparency will be too burdensome. The 
enforcement mechanism of the GPA that permits aggrieved suppliers to challenge 
a procuring entity, together with a possible option of a member being challenged 
at the WTO dispute settlement body where it is not conforming to the Agreement, 
make it difficult for developing countries to accede to this Agreement. 
 
The current proliferation of regional trade agreements between developed and 
developing countries, and those signed between developing countries with 
extensive provisions on government procurement can be considered as a reaction 
to the problems in the GPA and the WTO to achieve greater liberalization of 
government procurement.  These Agreements have similar and in some instances 
more binding provisions than those in the GPA. Such Agreements have been used 
by the proponents of trade liberalization to influence more countries to open up 
their government procurement markets even though these countries refuse to 
make similar commitments in the WTO. For developing countries, RTAs have 
been a motivation for instituting domestic reforms in procurement usually based 
on the UNCITRAL Model Law. There is no doubt that RTAs can be a building 
block to increased membership to the GPA by promoting the principles of non-
discrimination and transparency. However, RTAs can also be a deterrent for the 
development of the GPA as a global standard where they are considered as 
alternatives to multilateral disciplines in procurement under the ambit of the 
WTO. The impact of RTAs on the GPA will depend on the nature of these 
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Agreements and to what extent regionalism and multilateral trade arrangements 
work not as competitors but rather as complimentary systems. 
 
4.2. RECOMMENDATIONS 
 In light of the important position that government procurement plays in 
international trade as well as its pivotal role as a policy tool for development, it is 
opined that the GPA stands out as the most effective instrument to achieve 
harmonization of global procurement standards. Unlike the UNCITRAL Model 
Law, or the different regional instruments, the GPA has the force of the dispute 
settlement system of the WTO and the Trade Policy Review Mechanism that 
makes it enforceable. Although developing countries may regard this as one of the 
most repelling aspect of the GPA, it provides a lock-in effect for government 
procurement reforms especially in countries where corruption is rife and 
procurement reform is not likely to be easily accepted. 
 
Furthermore, the WTO offers a relatively more balanced negotiating forum for 
developing countries than in Regional Agreements. The imbalance in the bargaining 
power between a developed and developing country is more skewed in bilateral 
agreements where developing countries do not have the benefit of negotiating groups 
as in the WTO.145 As the trend has shown developing countries are more likely to 
make more binding commitments in bilateral agreements that what would have been 
required in the WTO. This is worsened by the fact that bilateral trade agreements do 
not offer preferential treatment to developing countries but are based on reciprocity 
between parties. 
 
However procurement initiatives within Regional Agreements between developing 
countries should be embraced as these encourage reform of national procurement 
laws. These may act as soft law that prepares countries to make binding commitments 
at the multilateral level. However the benefit of such Agreements will depend on the 
extent to which they liberalize the procurement markets of member states to third 
                                                 
145 Sometimes these  negotiating groups may  not be appropriate where there is a disparity of 
interests between the developing countries, for instance between a more developed country like 
India and a Least Developing County Like Uganda.. 
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parties, thereby encouraging competition. Nonetheless, caution must be taken in 
having several negotiating fora as these may strain the meager resources available for 
developing countries to negotiate.  
 
The above notwithstanding, the following specific recommendations are considered 
necessary if the GPA is to achieve acceptance among developing countries: 
 
4.2.1 Amendment of the GPA 
The Agreement needs to recognize the importance of preferential government 
procurement to address the needs of developing countries. The GPA should be 
amended to permit members to offer preferential treatment to their domestic industry 
in order to achieve stated development objectives. In this respect the GPA should 
adopt the approach of the UNCITRAL Model that permits this, albeit within a certain 
established framework to control the abuse of such flexibility. However, in view of 
the questioned benefits of such preferential procurement policies to general global 
and national welfare, the GPA would need to have a suitable time frame for the 
gradual phasing out through negotiations or according to an agreed framework of 
these policies. Furthermore there is a need to make the special and differential 
provisions as contained in Article V of the GPA binding and enforceable for them to 
be meaningful to developing countries.  
4.2.2 Coordination between different Institutions 
This is necessary if the GPA is to get legitimacy among developing countries as an 
Agreement that also caters for their needs as the UNCITRAL Model is regarded. 
Furthermore, coordination is necessary to harmonize the different instruments on 
government procurement that is the GPA; the UNCITRAL Model Law, the 
Procurement Guidelines of Financial Institutions and donor agencies; and the various 
regional instruments on procurement. Such coordination efforts could involve the 
relevant institutions obtaining observer status in the Committee on Government 
Procurement in the WTO which would encourage exchange of ideas necessary to 
streamline the harmonization of standards between different instruments. 146 
                                                 
146The only International Organisations with Observer Status in the Committee include:  the 
International Monetary Fund, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, United 
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4.2.3 Institutional and Human Capacity Building  
The relevant national institutions of developing countries need to be enabled through 
training of staff and increased funding through grants. This is necessary for effective 
implementation and monitoring of the GPA. Although this is being done by the 
World Bank together with regional institutions, training must be done in light of the 
GPA to obtain better understanding of the Agreements and its implications. 
 
4.3. CONCLUSION 
Although developing countries succeeded in stopping any negotiations for a 
multilateral Agreement on government procurement and still enjoy the non-member 
status to the GPA, it is opined that the status quo may not be long lived in view of the 
push for trade liberalization and the removal of all trade barriers. Developing 
countries therefore need to use this period to build up their negotiating positions and 
to ascertain the implications of any positions taken. Of importance is the need to 
participate as observers in the GPA which will enhance their capacities albeit without 
making any commitments.  
 
                                                                                                                                     
Nations Conference on Trade and Development and the  International Trade Centre. See further 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/memobs_e.htm   
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